166x Filetype PPTX File size 0.19 MB Source: www.unil.ch
Theory And Data Physics is supposed to be an empirical theory, i.e. a theory that can be tested against empirical data. Fundamental physics is supposed to provide a complete physical ontology for the world. Therefore, either the data against which a fundamental physical theory is tested is not itself physical, or else it is somehow to be understood as contained in the ontology of the theory itself. “Empirical” Saying that a theory is tested against empirical data suggests that the data is somehow “empirical”. “Empirical” comes from the Greek “ἐμπειρία”, which is usually translated as “experience”. One might then conclude that either experience is itself a physical thing, and hence part of the fundamental physical ontology, or else some extra principle is required to connect claims about the physical ontology to the experiential data. Dilemma Both options here seem unpalatable. One requires giving a physical analysis of experience itself, and hence solving the mind-body problem. The other requires some sort of “bridge principle” from physical claims to experiential claims, and raises the question of both the metaphysical status and justification of the bridge principle. Logical Empiricism th In the early 20 century, the school of logical empiricists tried to dress up the old empiricist account of meaning found in Hume and Locke with the modern garb of predicate calculus. Many (but not all) followed the principle that all meaningful claims must either be analytic (and hence “empty”) or reducible to claims about experience, such as a particular sort of visual experience (“red-spot-here-for-me- now”). Bridge Principles Since claims about conscious experience do not follow directly from claims about, e.g., the behavior of atoms, some logical empiricists who wanted to connect physical claims to data needed bridge principles.
no reviews yet
Please Login to review.