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Theory And Data
Physics is supposed to be an empirical
theory, i.e. a theory that can be tested
against empirical data.
Fundamental physics is supposed to provide
a complete physical ontology for the world.
Therefore, either the data against which a
fundamental physical theory is tested is not
itself physical, or else it is somehow to be
understood as contained in the ontology of
the theory itself.
“Empirical”
Saying that a theory is tested against empirical
data suggests that the data is somehow
“empirical”.
“Empirical” comes from the Greek “ἐμπειρία”,
which is usually translated as “experience”.
One might then conclude that either
experience is itself a physical thing, and hence
part of the fundamental physical ontology, or
else some extra principle is required to connect
claims about the physical ontology to the
experiential data.
Dilemma
Both options here seem unpalatable. One
requires giving a physical analysis of
experience itself, and hence solving the
mind-body problem. The other requires
some sort of “bridge principle” from
physical claims to experiential claims, and
raises the question of both the
metaphysical status and justification of the
bridge principle.
Logical Empiricism
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In the early 20 century, the school of
logical empiricists tried to dress up the old
empiricist account of meaning found in
Hume and Locke with the modern garb of
predicate calculus. Many (but not all)
followed the principle that all meaningful
claims must either be analytic (and hence
“empty”) or reducible to claims about
experience, such as a particular sort of
visual experience (“red-spot-here-for-me-
now”).
Bridge Principles
Since claims about conscious experience do
not follow directly from claims about, e.g.,
the behavior of atoms, some logical
empiricists who wanted to connect physical
claims to data needed bridge principles.
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