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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Signaling When (and When Not) to Be Cautious and
Self-Protective: Impulsive and Reflective Trust in Close
Relationships
Sandra L. Murray, Rebecca T. Pinkus, John G. Holmes, Brianna Harris, Sarah Gomillion, Maya
Aloni, Jaye L. Derrick, and Sadie Leder
Online First Publication, March 28, 2011. doi: 10.1037/a0023233
CITATION
Murray, S. L., Pinkus, R. T., Holmes, J. G., Harris, B., Gomillion, S., Aloni, M., Derrick, J. L., &
Leder, S. (2011, March 28). Signaling When (and When Not) to Be Cautious and
Self-Protective: Impulsive and Reflective Trust in Close Relationships. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0023233
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ©2011 American Psychological Association
2011, Vol. ●●, No. ●, 000–000 0022-3514/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0023233
Signaling When (and When Not) to Be Cautious and Self-Protective:
Impulsive and Reflective Trust in Close Relationships
Sandra L. Murray Rebecca T. Pinkus
University at Buffalo, State University of New York University of Western Sydney
John G. Holmes Brianna Harris, Sarah Gomillion, and Maya Aloni
University of Waterloo University at Buffalo, State University of New York
Jaye L. Derrick Sadie Leder
Research Institute on Addictions University at Buffalo, State University of New York
Adual process model is proposed to explain how automatic evaluative associations to the partner (i.e.,
impulsive trust) and deliberative expectations of partner caring (i.e., reflective trust) interact to govern
self-protection in romantic relationships. Experimental and correlational studies of dating and marital
relationships supported the model. Subliminally conditioning more positive evaluative associations to the
partner increased confidence in the partner’s caring, suggesting that trust has an impulsive basis. Being
high on impulsive trust (i.e., more positive evaluative associations to the partner on the Implicit
Association Test; Zayas & Shoda, 2005) also reduced the automatic inclination to distance in response
to doubts about the partner’s trustworthiness. It similarly reduced self-protective behavioral reactions to
these reflective trust concerns. The studies further revealed that the effects of impulsive trust depend on
working memory capacity: Being high on impulsive trust inoculated against reflective trust concerns for
people low on working memory capacity.
Keywords: trust, automaticity, risk regulation, working memory capacity, IAT
Romantic relationships are riddled with reason to self-protect set aside her need to avoid his rejection and, instead, solicit his
against the possibility of rejection. Such caution is central to cooperation, she needs to know whether it is safe for her to depend
interdependent life because conflicts of interest are inevitable onHarrytomeetherneeds(Holmes&Rempel,1989;Reis,Clark,
(Murray & Holmes, 2009). Imagine a conflict common to many &Holmes, 2004; Simpson, 2007).
households. Fastidious to her core, Sally loves a clean house, but Accordingtotheriskregulationmodel,trustinaspecificpartner
her partner, Harry, does not share her appreciation for sparkling signals the safety of approach (Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray,
counters and glowing hardwood. Sally cannot achieve her goal of Holmes, & Collins, 2006). Trust is experienced as a state of
spotlessness without cooperation from Harry, but soliciting his comfort (or unease) in the partner’s presence, as a basic apprehen-
help leaves her vulnerable to his nonresponsiveness. For Sally to sion of gain (or loss) through dependence on the partner (Deutsch,
1973; Holmes & Rempel, 1989). Being more trusting signals the
possibility of gain, releases people from self-protective concerns,
and allows approaching connection to the partner. In contrast,
Sandra L. Murray, Brianna Harris, Sarah Gomillion, Maya Aloni, and being less trusting signals the possibility of loss, preoccupies
Sadie Leder, Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State people with self-protection concerns, and motivates suspicious
University of New York; Rebecca T. Pinkus, Department of Psychology, states of mind and behavioral efforts to avoid the partner
University of Western Sydney, Penrith, New South Wales, Australia; John (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999).
G. Holmes, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada; Jaye L. Derrick, Research Institute on Addictions, Buf- Existing close relationships research uniformly has equated trust
falo, New York. with consciously held expectations (Murray et al., 2006). How-
This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health ever, the unconscious mind sometimes knows things that escape
Grant MH 60105-08 to Sandra L. Murray. We thank Shira Gabriel and the notice of the conscious mind (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Dijk-
Mark Seery for comments, Wilhelm Hofmann for the measure of working sterhuis, 2010; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002). In this spirit, the
memory capacity, Vivian Zayas for assistance with the Implicit Associa- current paper advances a dual process model of trust and self-
tion Test, Dale W. Griffin for statistical consultation and comments, and protection in relationships. The model assumes that trust has an
numerous undergraduates for their assistance. impulsive (i.e., relatively unconscious) form and a reflective (i.e.,
Correspondenceconcerningthisarticle should be addressed to Sandra L.
Murray, Department of Psychology, Park Hall, University at Buffalo, State relatively conscious) form. Impulsive trust refers to Sally’s auto-
University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260-4110. E-mail: smurray@ matic evaluative association to Harry. Reflective trust refers to her
buffalo.edu consciously held expectations about his caring and commitment to
1
2 MURRAYETAL.
her (Murray et al., 2006; Wieselquist et al., 1999). This model 1986; Olson & Fazio, 2008). For instance, priming positive objects
further assumes that more positive automatic evaluative associa- automatically activates arm movements associated with drawing
tions to the partner can inoculate against less trusting conscious things closer; priming negative objects automatically activates arm
beliefs in ways that short-circuit self-protection. Thus, being im- movements associated with pushing things away (Chen & Bargh,
pulsively trusting can motivate approaching and not avoiding 1999). In our model, automatic evaluative associations to the
partners even when reflective trust concerns suggest that caution is partner play a similar orienting function: signaling whether the
warranted. partner is safe and to be approached or risky and to be avoided.
Consistent with this assumption, people who evidence more pos-
Regulating Self-Protection: Impulsive and itive automatic associations to their partner on the Implicit Asso-
Reflective Trust ciation Test (IAT) also report greater feelings of relationship
Figure 1 presents our dual process model of trust and self- security (Zayas & Shoda, 2005).
protection (for similar dual-process models, see Gawronski & Reflective trust corresponds to conscious or considered beliefs
Bodenhausen, 2006; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Strack & about one’s value to the partner, a meta-perspective that also
Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). This model signals the possibility of good or bad things to come through
assumes that impulsive and reflective forms of trust jointly func- dependence (Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray et al., 2006). That
tion to orient behavior. In particular, they together provide a is, reflective trust refers to one’s beliefs about the strength of the
behavioral direction to action by revealing the safety of approach, partner’s caring and commitment, now and in the future (Holmes
andthereby, control when people self-protect and avoid the partner &Cameron, 2005; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray & Holmes,
and when they approach and seek deeper connection. 2009). Thus, Sally’s reflective trust in Harry is captured through
her expressions of faith that Harry values her specific qualities and
Signaling the Safety of Approach feels close and committed to her (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin,
2000). This definition departs from early definitions that located
Like prior models, the dual process model in Figure 1 assumes trust in dispositional judgments of the partner’s dependability and
that trust involves a feeling of relative comfort and safety (as predictability (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Our dual process
opposed to unease and vulnerability) in the partner’s presence model instead locates reflective trust in a dyadic judgment about
(Murray et al., 2006; Simpson, 2007). Unlike prior models, this the partner’s particular devotion to oneself, a definition shared by
model assumes that this sense of relative safety is represented recent models of attachment and interdependence (Mikulincer &
through both associative (i.e., impulsive) and propositional (i.e., Shaver, 2003; Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray et al., 2006; Reis
reflective) processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). et al., 2004; Wieselquist et al., 1999).
Impulsive trust corresponds to one’s immediate evaluative as- The dashed line connecting impulsive and reflective trust as-
sociation to the partner’s presence. That is, impulsive trust refers to sumes that these sentiments inform one another and can send
one’s automatic attitude toward the partner. In simple terms, being complementary or contradictory safety signals. The literature on
in the partner’s presence activates an immediate evaluative reac- attitudes suggests that automatic evaluative associations are typi-
tion. This affective association signals the possibility of good or cally formed through associative learning in concrete situations,
bad things to come. Thus, Sally’s impulsive trust in Harry is whereas deliberative expectations are typically formed through
captured through her automatic evaluative association to him abstract reasoning (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Fazio, 1986;
(Murray, Holmes, & Pinkus, 2010). This definition of impulsive Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000). This implies
trust has long intellectual roots in attitude theory (Fazio, 1986; that actual prior experiences with a partner being more or less
Olson & Fazio, 2008). Automatic evaluative associations (i.e., caring and responsive may more strongly condition impulsive than
attitudes) are thought to orient people to their social worlds, reflective trust. Consistent with this logic, newlyweds whose part-
signaling what is good and to be approached or bad and to be ner behaved less responsively early in their marriage evidenced
avoided (Alexopoulos & Ric, 2007; Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; less positive automatic evaluative associations to their partner after
Banse, 2001; Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Fazio, 4 years of marriage. However, such concrete early experiences did
Figure 1. Adual process model of trust and self-protection in close relationships.
IMPULSIVE AND REFLECTIVE TRUST 3
not predict their later explicit beliefs about the partner’s caring behaved nonresponsively automatically activates a behavioral ori-
(Murray et al., 2010). Although still sensitive to the partner’s entation (i.e., hostility) for distancing oneself from the partner
actual behaviors, reflectively trusting expectations typically shift (Murray et al., 2008). Experiencing chronic concerns about the
as people consider their own worthiness of love (Murray, Rose, partner’s trustworthiness also strengthens overtly self-protective
Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002), explain experiences with behavior (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray et al., 2006). That is,
previous relationship partners (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), and it increases both the tendency to be suspicious in one’s inferences,
engage in motivated distortions of ongoing events (Murray, 1999). a mind-set that makes it easier to detect (and avoid) rejection, and
Because impulsive trust and reflective trust develop through the tendency to be distancing and avoidant in one’s behavior, a
only partially overlapping processes, these sentiments can be dis- reaction that makes rejection less likely and less painful. For
sociated. For instance, a low-self-esteem Sally might be high on instance, people who are less trusting read rejection into events as
impulsive trust (because Harry treats her well) but low on reflec- ambiguous as their partner being in a bad mood (Murray, Bellavia,
tive trust (because she cannot fully convince herself that such Rose, & Griffin, 2003). They also react to daily hurts by behaving
kindnesses will always continue). In contrast, a high-self-esteem in a cold and rejecting way toward their partner (Murray et al.,
Gayle might be low on impulsive trust (because her partner be- 2003). Similarly, people who are less trusting overreact to daily
haves reasonably selfishly) but high on reflective trust (because conflicts, treating them as an excuse to withdraw from the rela-
she easily generates excuses for such lapses). In fact, prior research tionship (Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Rubin, 2010).
reveals dissociations between more implicit and explicit relation- Impulsive trust. Ourmodelalsoassumesthatimpulsivetrust
ship sentiments (Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008; Mur- can qualify the influence that reflective trust has over the regula-
ray, Holmes, et al., 2009). For instance, more positive evaluative tion of self-protection. How so? Being low on impulsive trust
associations to the partner predict greater relationship stability should only reinforce self-protective caution and avoidance in
regardless of reported satisfaction (LeBel & Campbell, 2009; Lee, response to doubts about the partner’s caring, because less positive
Rogge, & Reis, 2010). Further, people who feel pressured to automatic evaluative associations to the partner echo conscious
justify their commitments because they are highly invested and suspicions that approach might not be safe. However, being high
have few alternatives claim to be satisfied in their relationships on impulsive trust might have the power to inoculate against
even when their automatic reactions to their partner are relatively conscious doubts about the partner’s caring.
negative (Scinta & Gable, 2007). Whymight such an effect emerge? First, more positive automatic
evaluative associations might function as a chronic or “selfish” goal to
The Regulation of Self-Protection approach that neutralizes avoidance goals activated in a specific
situation of rejection (Bargh & Huang, 2009). Second, more positive
By signaling the safety of approach, the impulsive and reflective automatic evaluative associations to the partner might make the actual
bases of trust jointly regulate self-protective caution (as indicated by experience of contemplating rejection less hurtful (Banaji & Heiphetz,
their convergent influence on Paths A and B). The model assumes that 2010; Dijksterhuis, 2010; Fazio, 1986). Because interacting with the
self-protective caution is exercised through behavioral expressions of partner automatically primes one’s evaluative associations, any con-
approach versus avoidance (Murray et al., 2006). In particular, stron- cerns about the partner’s behavior are likely to be mitigated by more
ger self-protection concerns promote avoidance (or conversely inhibit positive general evaluations (Kunda & Spencer, 2003; Mikulincer,
approach), whereas weaker self-protection concerns promote ap- Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001). Third, evaluative associ-
proach (or conversely inhibit avoidance).1 Our model differentiates
self-protection into an immediate and automatic inclination to ap- ations are likely to be slow to align or catch up with newly emerging
proach versus avoid the partner (Path A) and a subsequent, sometimes doubts that could undermine such positive approach signals. Indeed,
corrective, overt behavioral reaction (Path B). We draw the distinction automatic evaluations are thought to be asymmetrically malleable,
between automatic inclinations and overt behavior because not every more readily formed than undone (Gregg et al., 2006). Therefore,
inclination is acted upon. Instead, people can correct automatic be- being high on impulsive trust might provide a counterweight to
havioral inclinations when they are motivated and able to do so emerging doubts, because such automatic evaluative sentiment stub-
(Murray et al., 2008; Murray & Holmes, 2009; Olson & Fazio, 2008). bornly retains its relative positivity. Fourth, automatic evaluative
Imagine Sally and Harry have an argument serious enough to cause sentiments can elicit corresponding behaviors even when contradic-
her to question his devotion to her. Such doubts activate the automatic tory explicit sentiments are accessible in memory (Wilson et al.,
inclination to self-protect and withdraw (Murray et al., 2008). When 2000). For instance, unconsciously primed thoughts of security
Sally is depleted, she might act on such intent, but when better heighten empathy (Mikulincer, Gillath, et al., 2001), diminish out-
judgment prevails she might apologize instead (Finkel & Campbell, group derogation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), and increase the
2001). desire to seek support from others in dealing with a personal crisis
Reflective trust. Existing research reveals how being low (Pierce & Lydon, 1998), even when conscious reservations oppose
versus high on reflective trust can regulate automatic self- such behaviors.
protective inclinations and overtly self-protective behavior. Expe- In sum, our dual process model assumes that impulsive trust can
riencing state doubts about a partner’s trustworthiness triggers modulate the safety signal conveyed by reflective trust concerns.
automatic efforts to avoid the partner (Murray et al., 2006). For
example, preoccupying participants with the fear that their dating 1 Our model assumes that approach and avoidance are polar opposites at
partner will discover their secret selves spontaneously elicits a the level of behavioral expression (Cacioppo, Gardner, Berntson, 1999).
vigilant and prevention-oriented mind-set (Cavallo, Fitzsimons, & Accordingly, approach necessarily implies inhibited avoidance and avoid-
Holmes, 2010). Similarly, thinking of a time when a partner ance necessarily implies inhibited approach.
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